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God coming into being or would there still be the same God notwithstanding a 
replacement of all its parts? Jantzen may be able to satisfactorally address these 
puzzles, but she does not do so in God's World, God's Body. 
The Emergence of Whitehead's Metaphysics, 1925-1929, by Lewis S. Ford. 
Albany New York: State University of New York Press, 1984. Pp. xv and 351. 
Paper $19.95, Cloth $39.50. 
Reviewed by DONALD A. CROSBY, Colorado State University. 
This is a serious book, of great importance and interest to persons interested in 
understanding the development and content of Alfred North Whitehead's thought. 
But I cannot help beginning this review on a note of delicious irony whose point 
will not be lost on anyone who has puzzled over the text of Whitehead's major 
philosophical treatise, Process and Reality, based on his Gifford Lectures in 
1928 and first published in 1929. After finishing Science and the Modern World 
in 1925, Whitehead declared in a letter dated May 16, 1926, that he wanted to 
follow this work up "with something purely addressed to philosophers-short 
and clear, if I can make it so!" (179). The resulting volume, none other than 
Process and Reality itself, has many virtues, but brevity and ease of interpretation 
are certainly not among them. 
Lewis Ford offers us a method and theory of interpretation which goes a long 
way toward explaining the notorious difficulty of the book, arguing that 
Whitehead's thinking continued to be in a ferment of development throughout 
its writing, and that many of its most distinctive features were introduced in 
very late stages of that development. Some of these features were only vaguely 
sketched or were not integrated with full consistency into what had already been 
written, so there is an important sense in which Process and Reality was not so 
much finished as abandoned, i.e., offered to the world in a volatile, still emerging 
form. But Ford reasons that it could hardly have been otherwise, because the 
onrush of Whitehead's creative intuitions and imaginative projections could not 
be held in check. They continued to race ahead of his more settled ideas, 
suggesting promising new lines of conceptualization which he did not entirely 
succeed in assimilating or bringing to precise expression by the time the manu-
script had to be turned over to the publisher. 
Ford does not stop at trying to trace the development of Whitehead's thought 
from the summer of 1927, when he produced the first draft of his Gifford 
Lectures, to the time of the publication of Process and Reality. He goes back 
further in time, to the period in which Whitehead was working on Science and 
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the Modern World, a book which was also based on a series of lectures: the 
Lowell Lectures of 1925. He gives us an account of the development of that 
book in which he contends that its earliest form was simply an extension of the 
philosophy of nature laid out in Whitehead's earlier writings, and that only in 
its later form does it begin to resemble in some important respects the metaphysical 
outlook of Whitehead's mature philosophy. Ford thus attempts to trace the 
unfolding of Whitehead's metaphysical thought from its earliest stages in 1925, 
through its evolvings in Religion in the Making and Symbolism, Its Meaning and 
Effect (published in 1926 and 1927 respectively), to its culmination in Process 
and Reality. And he insists that failure to understand this complicated process 
of development can produce serious mistakes in interpretation of Whitehead's 
metaphysical writings and leave needlessly opaque many crucial passages of 
those writings which a genetic account can mercifully clarify and explain. 
Ford contrasts his genetic approach with the kind of systematic approach to 
analyzing Whitehead's later writings (i.e., those from 1925 on) which has tended 
to hold sway up to now. While for the latter the aim is at "maximum coherence 
of argument," and "[d]isparate materials are assembled to fit one total scheme," 
for the former "the levels of allowable meaning are stratified, and a given text 
is interpreted in terms of the context of meaning for that stratum." Hence "sys-
tematic interpretation, often in a harmonizing fashion, seeks the widest possible 
unit of interpretation." "Genetic interpretation," on the other hand, "seeks for 
the smallest unit of interpretation ... " (12,178). This talk of "strata" and 
discrete "units of interpretation" is reminiscent of the techniques of biblical 
criticism, and Ford's interpretive strategy bears a close resemblance to some of 
those techniques (he summarizes the three main steps of his strategy on p. 178). 
Most notably, he tends to view the published forms of Whitehead's writings as 
resulting from a succession of redactions which left most of the earlier material 
virtually unchanged but brought that earlier material into new, and sometimes 
radically different, contexts of meaning. An obvious difference from the modern 
view of the evolution of the Bible is that all the redactions are assumed to be 
Whitehead's own, representing successive phases of the forging of his distinctive 
philosophical outlook, and not the work of a series of different editors. 
Much of the evidence Ford draws upon in presenting his developmental thesis 
is internal to the four writings already mentioned. But he is also greatly interested 
in what can be learned about the differences between the actual lectures on which 
these works are based and their final published forms, since these differences 
can help to illuminate the ongoing evolution of Whitehead's ideas. Other sorts 
of external evidence he bases his thesis upon are Whitehead's letters and his 
other lectures of the period (such as his address on 'Time," delivered to an 
International Congress of Philosophy in 1926), notes taken by students in 
Whitehead's classes, and the Prospectus for the Gifford Lectures. Substantial 
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amounts of this external evidence are contained in appendices to Ford's book, 
making it readily accessible to his readers and giving them a basis for independent 
assessment of the plausibility of his conclusions. Whatever one may think about 
these conclusions, the book as a whole is a mine of information and contains 
intriguing, highly detailed speculations about the significance of this information 
which cannot help but fascinate students of Whitehead's thought. 
Two especially interesting examples of the kind of contribution Ford's study 
can make to our understanding of Whitehead are his way of dealing with a 
critique of Whitehead by William P. Alston and his analysis of milestones in 
the progression toward Whitehead's final conception of God. Alston's criticism, 
contained in an article published in Review of Metaphysics 5, 1952, is that 
Whitehead's doctrine of mutual internal relatedness, set out in Science and the 
Modern World, contradicts his affirmation of pluralism. The trouble with this 
complaint, argues Ford, is that it "ignores any development" (57). His own 
rather startling claim is that Science and the Modern World does espouse a 
metaphysical monism of a single underlying substantial activity and its many 
modes, and that only later (i.e., at the time of his writing of Religion in the 
Making) did Whitehead come to affirm a pluralism of actual occasions, each to 
be conceived as a unique creative act. Viewed solely from the standpoint of a 
systematic approach to the Whiteheadian corpus, Alston's criticism has devas-
tating force, but seen from the perspective of the genetic approach, the alleged 
inconsistency vanishes because we need no longer assume that Whitehead held 
to monism and pluralism at the same time (57, 96-101, 127-129). 
As for God, Ford shows how Whitehead came to perceive the need for God 
in order to give coherence and completeness to his metaphysical speculations, 
and how he gradually came to the understanding of God's nature and role that 
we associate with his thought today. The Lowell Lectures of 1925 contain, 
according to Ford, no theistic dimension; the chapter in Science and the Modern 
World on "God" was added later. It was added because the two types of limitation 
which do not require God, logic and causation, were not adequate, in Whitehead's 
judgment, to account for two other types of limitation (or concretion) we experi-
ence in the universe: the restriction of possibilities to those productive of value 
(experienced as the objectivity or obligatoriness of value), and the otherwise 
arbitrary and inexplicable dimensionality of space-time (later explained diffe-
rently by Whitehead in terms of the evolution of successive cosmic epochs, each 
with its own distinctive traits, principles, and laws) (114, 118-119). 
In Religion and the Making the concept of God undergoes further development, 
but only very late in the compositional history of Process and Reality is the 
distinction between the primordial and the consequent natures of God explicitly 
drawn. Ford suggests at least two reasons for this late emergence of Whitehead's 
characteristic "dipolar" view of God. One is that only late on did he formulate 
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his theory of consciousness, which required that physical feelings be a part of 
integrated intellectual feelings in a single concrescence, and this suggested to 
him that in order for God to be conscious, there must be a physical aspect to 
God (212). The second reason is that the consequent nature of God, once arrived 
at, could provide a way of doing justice to what Whitehead regarded as a 
fundamental religious hope or intuition, that of the everlasting preservation of 
achieved value which otherwise would gradually fade and perish from the universe 
(l41, 195-197). In this way he could supplement his idea, already present in 
Science and the Modern World, that God is the ground of value, with the 
conviction that He is also the preserver of value. And he could provide in Part 
V of Process and Reality a metaphysics of religious experience (akin to that in 
Religion in the Making, where some of the functions of the consequent nature 
had already been hinted at) to complement the metaphysics of ordinary experience 
in the first four Parts. 
Apart from its intrinsic interest, this genetic interpretation of Whitehead's 
concept of God gives us a plausible explanation of why the consequent nature 
of God is so sketchily and cryptically discussed in Process and Reality, of why 
it remains only loosely integrated with the primordial nature (or, for that matter, 
with God's superjective nature), and of why Whitehead never got around to 
giving a satisfactory explanation of "how God as an everlasting concrescence 
can ever be objectified for the world in a system where concrescences must be 
completed in determinate unity before they can be prehended" (229). Had it not 
been for the "historical accident" of the book's particular process of composition 
and development, Ford suggests, some of the problems with Whitehead's concept 
of God with which we are by now all too familiar might have been avoided. 
But as it is, these problems await the revisions and supplementations of his 
interpreters (228). If his thinking was as much in ceaseless flux as Ford argues 
that it was, Whitehead would no doubt have welcomed continuing attempts to 
modify and improve his unfinished system-a system which was not only about 
process but also in process right up to the time of its publication. 
I will close with two critical observations. Ford misses an opportunity to 
clarify the nature of Whitehead's thought, especially for those only vaguely 
familiar with it, when he goes to great lengths to stress the evolution of the 
"panpsychistic" aspect of Whitehead's system but never once mentions that the 
system in its final form is every bit as much "panphysicalistic" in character. 
Whitehead's introduction of a consequent nature for God means that every entity 
in the universe has both a mental and a physical aspect. This is perhaps the most 
basic way of indicating how he sought to avoid the bifurcation, not only of 
nature, but of the whole of reality. Also, the term "panpsychism" connotes some 
sort of idealism, no matter how carefully we might try to qualify or control its 
use. We are thus in constant danger of losing sight of the intended metaphorical 
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significance of Whitehead's use of the tenn "mental." Since he associates men-
tality mainly with self-created novelty, and physicalicity with efficient causal 
continuity, and since the novelty of which he speaks is much broader than 
anything like conscious purpose or deliberate innovation (it can include, for 
example, quantum indeterminacy or the oscillations of a wave impulse), it might 
not be a bad idea to use the term "panautomism" /1/ as a partner to "panpsychism." 
Although the two terms would not mean quite the same thing, even in the context 
of Whitehead's system, I submit that together they can capture his meaning more 
accurately and successfully than either term can alone. Moreover, the complemen-
tary tenns "panphysicalism" and "panautomism" can suggest the interweaving 
of efficient and final causality which Whitehead took to be one of the major 
tasks of an adequate metaphysical system. 
Secondly, Ford seems to be arguing in one place (127-128; the argument is 
again alluded to on 248) that creation must be vested entirely in each temporal 
event and that it cannet be attributed in any way to God, because to attribute it 
in any degree to God would be to accept complete divine detenninism and to 
make God the source of evil as well as good. I am sure that I must be misinter-
preting this argument, but it is so vaguely presented that it appears to pose a 
false dichotomy. God's primordial nature is said in Process and Reality to be 
the most fundamental instance of creativity in the universe, and His ordering of 
the eternal objects into valuative relevance for each new occasion (one of the 
two ways in which God functions as a principle of limitation in Science and [he 
Modern World, as seen above) is a creative, though not a temporal, activity. It 
is within the context of this primordial evaluation, as well as within the context 
of its past actual world, that each occasion achieves its own creative self-reali-
zation. 
So I think that Ford should have said that the power of creation lies not merely 
in the concrescing occasion, but also in God, because God plays an essential 
role in the creation of every new occasion by specifying the range of value within 
which it can take place and by providing the thread of unity and final causality 
around which it can organize its subjective aim. God's primordial creativity also 
accounts for an occasion's occurrence here-now rather than at some other possible 
"place" in the spatio-temporal continuum. To say this is to show how the occa-
sion's degree of autonomous self-realization is made possible, since in 
Whitehead's system it would not be possible without God. It is not to deny 
self-creativity to the occasion, nor does it require that we must attribute evil to 
God. 
Ford is well aware of all of this, or course. The problem is not in his under-
standing but in the vagueness of his argument, and perhaps more fundamentally, 
in some sense of the term "creation" which he desires to reject but does not 
clearly specify. On page 241, for example, he seems to want to stipulate that 
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"creation" be confined to the activity whereby "an actual occasion comes into 
being from its past and its initial subjective aim, by means of its own decision." 
This definition would exclude God, since God is not an actual occasion. God 
would still be an essential condition for an occasion's self-creation, however, 
through His provision of the occasion's initial aim, and would thus share, in 
some sense, in its creation. Furthermore, is there any sound reason for denying 
that God is "creative," or that a kind of "creation" takes place in God, in both 
His primordial and consequent natures? I hardly think that Ford would make 
such a denial. So the issue still remains confused, at least in my mind. I do not 
believe that I am quibbling; the problem of how best to state God's role in the 
"creation" of an actual entity is of basic importance for the comprehension of 
Whitehead's system. 
This is an extremely provocative book. It gives evidence of years of painstaking 
labor and is most impressive in the ingenuity and general clarity and convincing-
ness of its reasoning. I do not think that Whitehead scholarship will ever be the 
same now that we have it to draw upon as a resource; it could even produce 
something like a "paradigm shift." And yet, Ford is appropriately modest about 
the tentativeness of many of his conclusions and invites his readers to share with 
him in putting his arguments to the test and continuing the program of research 
he has so admirably begun. 
NOTE 
I. Whitehead's philosophical soul-mate, William James, also laid great stress on the idea of 
panautomism in expressing his version of metaphysical pluralism. As James put it in his essay, "The 
Dilemma of Determinism," there is "a certain amount of loose play" of the parts in relation to the 
whole, something in each part "really of its own." See John J. McDermott (ed.) (1977). The Writings 
of William James. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 587-610, pp. 591·593. 
Without Proof or Evidence: Essays of O. K. Bouwsma, edited and with an 
introduction by J. L. Craft and Ronald E. Hustwit, The University of Nebraska 
Press, 1984. pp. xiv, 161. 
Reviewed by PETER V AN INW AGEN, Syracuse University. 
This book is a rather miscellaneous collection of O. K. Bouwsma's writings on 
religious topics. (One of the pieces, an introduction to a collection of Nietzsche's 
letters, is only indirectly connected with religion.) Most of the papers-if that 
